history never repeats
by John at 4/05/2004 01:22:00 PM
I fear my insufficient support for Dear Leader's War Against Terrorism in Iraq has lead us back here.
"Local outbreaks against British rule had occurred even before the news reached Iraq that the country had been given only mandate status. Upon the death of an important Shia mujtahid (religious scholar) in early May 1920, Sunni and Shia ulama temporarily put aside their differences as the memorial services metamorphosed into political rallies. Ramadan, the Islamic month of fasting, began later in that month; once again, through nationalistic poetry and oratory, religious leaders exhorted the people to throw off the bonds of imperialism. Violent demonstrations and strikes followed the British arrest of several leaders.
When the news of the mandate reached Iraq in late May, a group of Iraqi delegates met with Wilson and demanded independence. Wilson dismissed them as a "handful of ungrateful politicians." Nationalist political activity was stepped up, and the grand mujtahid of Karbala, Imam Shirazi, and his son, Mirza Muhammad Riza, began to organize the effort in earnest. Arab flags were made and distributed, and pamphlets were handed out urging the tribes to prepare for revolt. Muhammad Riza acted as liaison among insurgents in An Najaf and in Karbala, and the tribal confederations. Shirazi then issued a fatwa (religious ruling), pointing out that it was against Islamic law for Muslims to countenance being ruled by non-Muslims, and he called for a jihad against the British. By July 1920, Mosul was in rebellion against British rule, and the insurrection moved south down the Euphrates River valley. The southern tribes, who cherished their long-held political autonomy, needed little inducement to join in the fray. They did not cooperate in an organized effort against the British, however, which limited the effect of the revolt. The country was in a state of anarchy for three months; the British restored order only with great difficulty and with the assistance of Royal Air Force bombers. British forces were obliged to send for reinforcements from India and from Iran.
...
The 1920 revolt had been very costly to the British in both manpower and money. Whitehall was under domestic pressure to devise a formula that would provide the maximum control over Iraq at the least cost to the British taxpayer. The British replaced the military regime with a provisional Arab government, assisted by British advisers and answerable to the supreme authority of the high commissioner for Iraq, Cox. The new administration provided a channel of communication between the British and the restive population, and it gave Iraqi leaders an opportunity to prepare for eventual self-government. The provisional government was aided by the large number of trained Iraqi administrators who returned home when the French ejected Faisal from Syria. Like earlier Iraqi governments, however, the provisional government was composed chiefly of Sunni Arabs; once again the Shias were underrepresented.
At the Cairo Conference of 1921, the British set the parameters for Iraqi political life that were to continue until the 1958 revolution..." (emphasis mine)
The Economist says this: As coalition forces battle with both Sunni and Shia militants in Iraq, influential voices in Washington are asking if the country is descending into civil war—and whether America will still be able to hand over power to Iraqis on June 30th.
The Washington Post says this: The unrest signaled that the U.S. military faces armed opposition on two fronts: in scarred Sunni towns such as Fallujah and, as of Sunday, in a Shiite-dominated region of the country that had remained largely acquiescent, if uneasy about the U.S. role. If put down forcefully, a Shiite uprising -- infused with religious imagery, and symbols drawn from Iraq's colonial past and the current Palestinian conflict -- could achieve a momentum of its own.
I won't bore you tabulations of the number of dead Iraqi civilians and policemen and soldiers. I won't say the cost has been too high. But, if worse comes to worst, it will be for nothing. Iraq will be fragmented, and what's left after the Kurds form their own nation will end up a Shia theocracy or another Sunni dictatorship. Hope is not a plan, but hope for an exit is all Dear Leader has given us.
Update: I apologize - what I wrote above isn't very clear. Here's what I am trying to say:
Current events in Iraq resemble the events leading up to the Iraqi Revolution of 1920, which cost the British and the Iraqis dearly, and resulted in the creation of a long term provisional Iraqi government that was dominated by one of the opposing religious factions. In 1958, this repressive, pro-British Iraqi government was overthrown in a military coup, which lead in short order to the the rise of the Baathist party and Saddam Hussein.
The White House has not provided a plan for the separation of American forces from the new Iraqi government. It has barely described what the American/Iraqi political relationship will look like after June 30. The Kurds are our only allies in Iraq, but their chief concern is continued autonomy, not the larger Iraqi state. They will not fight our battles for us. If American military forces withdraw there will be civil war and new dictatorships, and if we stay there will be bloody and growing opposition to our presence. Palestine is probably a good example of what we can look forward to in the latter case. Our failure so far has been to hope for the best without preparing for the worst. Expect this trend to continue.
"Local outbreaks against British rule had occurred even before the news reached Iraq that the country had been given only mandate status. Upon the death of an important Shia mujtahid (religious scholar) in early May 1920, Sunni and Shia ulama temporarily put aside their differences as the memorial services metamorphosed into political rallies. Ramadan, the Islamic month of fasting, began later in that month; once again, through nationalistic poetry and oratory, religious leaders exhorted the people to throw off the bonds of imperialism. Violent demonstrations and strikes followed the British arrest of several leaders.
When the news of the mandate reached Iraq in late May, a group of Iraqi delegates met with Wilson and demanded independence. Wilson dismissed them as a "handful of ungrateful politicians." Nationalist political activity was stepped up, and the grand mujtahid of Karbala, Imam Shirazi, and his son, Mirza Muhammad Riza, began to organize the effort in earnest. Arab flags were made and distributed, and pamphlets were handed out urging the tribes to prepare for revolt. Muhammad Riza acted as liaison among insurgents in An Najaf and in Karbala, and the tribal confederations. Shirazi then issued a fatwa (religious ruling), pointing out that it was against Islamic law for Muslims to countenance being ruled by non-Muslims, and he called for a jihad against the British. By July 1920, Mosul was in rebellion against British rule, and the insurrection moved south down the Euphrates River valley. The southern tribes, who cherished their long-held political autonomy, needed little inducement to join in the fray. They did not cooperate in an organized effort against the British, however, which limited the effect of the revolt. The country was in a state of anarchy for three months; the British restored order only with great difficulty and with the assistance of Royal Air Force bombers. British forces were obliged to send for reinforcements from India and from Iran.
...
The 1920 revolt had been very costly to the British in both manpower and money. Whitehall was under domestic pressure to devise a formula that would provide the maximum control over Iraq at the least cost to the British taxpayer. The British replaced the military regime with a provisional Arab government, assisted by British advisers and answerable to the supreme authority of the high commissioner for Iraq, Cox. The new administration provided a channel of communication between the British and the restive population, and it gave Iraqi leaders an opportunity to prepare for eventual self-government. The provisional government was aided by the large number of trained Iraqi administrators who returned home when the French ejected Faisal from Syria. Like earlier Iraqi governments, however, the provisional government was composed chiefly of Sunni Arabs; once again the Shias were underrepresented.
At the Cairo Conference of 1921, the British set the parameters for Iraqi political life that were to continue until the 1958 revolution..." (emphasis mine)
The Economist says this: As coalition forces battle with both Sunni and Shia militants in Iraq, influential voices in Washington are asking if the country is descending into civil war—and whether America will still be able to hand over power to Iraqis on June 30th.
The Washington Post says this: The unrest signaled that the U.S. military faces armed opposition on two fronts: in scarred Sunni towns such as Fallujah and, as of Sunday, in a Shiite-dominated region of the country that had remained largely acquiescent, if uneasy about the U.S. role. If put down forcefully, a Shiite uprising -- infused with religious imagery, and symbols drawn from Iraq's colonial past and the current Palestinian conflict -- could achieve a momentum of its own.
I won't bore you tabulations of the number of dead Iraqi civilians and policemen and soldiers. I won't say the cost has been too high. But, if worse comes to worst, it will be for nothing. Iraq will be fragmented, and what's left after the Kurds form their own nation will end up a Shia theocracy or another Sunni dictatorship. Hope is not a plan, but hope for an exit is all Dear Leader has given us.
Update: I apologize - what I wrote above isn't very clear. Here's what I am trying to say:
Current events in Iraq resemble the events leading up to the Iraqi Revolution of 1920, which cost the British and the Iraqis dearly, and resulted in the creation of a long term provisional Iraqi government that was dominated by one of the opposing religious factions. In 1958, this repressive, pro-British Iraqi government was overthrown in a military coup, which lead in short order to the the rise of the Baathist party and Saddam Hussein.
The White House has not provided a plan for the separation of American forces from the new Iraqi government. It has barely described what the American/Iraqi political relationship will look like after June 30. The Kurds are our only allies in Iraq, but their chief concern is continued autonomy, not the larger Iraqi state. They will not fight our battles for us. If American military forces withdraw there will be civil war and new dictatorships, and if we stay there will be bloody and growing opposition to our presence. Palestine is probably a good example of what we can look forward to in the latter case. Our failure so far has been to hope for the best without preparing for the worst. Expect this trend to continue.
